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INTRODUCTION 
Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. has recently and eloquently 
championed judicial reliance on unpublished opinions.1 Judge 
Martin, who speaks from more than two decades of service on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, substantially 
improves understanding of this court. Judge Martin informally and 
pragmatically scrutinizes critical problems that confront the modern 
regional circuits through the prism of unpublished determinations 
while elucidating judicial dependence on these decisions. Judge 
Martin apologizes for the dearth of empirical data on the decisions' 
invocation, but the jurist affords subjective opinions, personal views, 
and revealing anecdotes based on practical experience. 
Judge Martin also impeccably timed his article's publication, which 
coincided with the December 1998 issuance by the Commission on 
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (the 
Commission) of its final report and suggestions.2 The Commission 
had one year to study the appellate "system, with particular reference 
to the Ninth Circuit," and to write a report with recommendations for 
such change as may be appropriate for prompt, fair, and effective 
caseload resolution.3 The thorough Commission evaluation 
illuminates Judge Martin's endeavor and supplies some information 
thatJudge Martin did not. For example, the commissioners indicate 
the percentage of oral arguments provided and visiting judges 
employed by each court.4 These propositions mean that Judge 
Martin's In Defense of Unpublished opinions5 warrants a response and 
that its ideas can be usefully compared with the Commission work. 
This essay undertakes that effort. 
First, the Essay descriptively assesses Judge Martin's account of the 
modern Sixth Circuit, attempting to derive instructive perspectives 
1. See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 177 
(1999). 
2. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR TIIE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 18, 1998), available at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/ 
final/appstruc.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. 
3. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a)(l), 111 Stat 2440, 2491 (1997) (detailing 
the establishment and responsibilities of the Commission on Structural Alternatives 
for the Federal Courts of Appeals). 
4. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 22, tbl. 2-6 (affording the percentage 
of cases decided on the merits that had oral arguments; for example, in 1997 the 6th 
Circuit held oral argument in 50% of cases and the 9th Circuit in 39%); COMMISSION 
ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR TIIE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 
108, Thi. 6a (1997) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS] (illustrating the frequency with 
which visitingjudges decide appeals on the merits). 
5. See Martin, supra note 1. 
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from it.6 This Essay finds thatJudge Martin's article yields helpful 
insights, especially regarding use of those decisions and concepts 
which he premises on twenty years of dispute resolution. Despite the 
value of his views, however, few of these ideas have empirical support 
and the emphasis on unpublished determinations is rather narrow, 
thus complicating the formulation of definitive conclusions about 
how the Sixth Circuit actually functions. 
Second, this Essay descriptively evaluates the Commission study in 
an effort to enhance comprehension of the Sixth Circuit 7 I ascertain 
that the Commission assembled, analyzed, and synthesized much 
empirical data. This information advances appreciation of the Sixth 
Circuit, particularly by facilitating comparisons, which confirm and 
challenge perspectives articulated by Judge Martin. The material 
correspondingly suggests that the court may perform less well than it 
could and less effectively than numerous other tribunals. However, 
the Commission's ideas, even in combination with Judge Martin's 
views, are not broad or refined enough to permit conclusive findings. 
Third, this Essay provides recommendations to increase 
understanding of the Sixth Circuit and improve its operations.8 For 
instance, the collection, assessment, and synthesis of additional 
empirical data, especially together with the information compiled by 
Judge Martin and the Commission, would yield more certain 
determinations. The court should also consult ways that the tribunal 
works less efficaciously than it might and adopt measures that would 
enhance circuit operations. 
I. ANALYSIS OF IN DEFENSE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
A. Descriptive Analysis 
Judge Martin persuasively defends invocation of unpublished 
opinions while providing valuable perspectives on the Sixth Circuit. 
The jurist opens his article, In Defense of Unpublished opinions, by 
asserting that the growth in caseloads and concomitantly published 
dispositions threatens to overwhelm the courts.9 Judge Martin 
6. See infra notes 9-60 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 61-116 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 118-53 and accompanying text. 
9. See Martin, supra note l, at 177 (stating that appellate judges are encumbered 
by "the weight of tens of thousands of appeals every year, and [that] our 'multiplied 
utterances' would increase beyond all reason were we forced to publish all our 
opinions"); see also Gilbert S. Merritt, The Decision Making Process in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1385, 1386 (1990) (stating that an increase in caseloads has 
overburdened judges and diminished the quality of opinions). 
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contends that unpublished decisions are a "pressure valve ... a way to 
pan for judicial gold while throwing the less influential opinions back 
into the strerun."10 He also claims that the federal appellate judiciary 
considers unpublished determinations a "necessary, and not 
necessarily evil, part of the job."11 Judge Martin predicted that these 
ideas would receive support from responses to an informal Judicial 
Conference survey-respecting courts' inconsistent use and citation 
of unpublished decisions and continuing designation of some 
dispositions as unpublished-because his colleagues on the Sixth 
Circuit and other tribunals are satisfied with the status quo.12 Judge 
Martin proved prescient, as the courts' chief judges voiced nearly 
unanimous opposition to change.13 Judge Martin juxtaposes the 
above views with those of legal academicians who find that 
unpublished opm10ns create many systemic problems.14 He 
enumerates a litany of criticisms-"loss of precedent, sloppy 
decisions, lack of uniformity, difficulty of higher court review, 
10. Martin, supra note 1, at 178 (arguing that unpublished opinions serve to filter 
unnecessary information and reduce the publication burden of the court). See 
generally THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL- THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEALS 119-35 (1994) (arguing that unpublished opinions serve to filter 
unnecessary information and lessen the publication burden of the courts' opinions). 
11. Martin, supra note l, at 178-79 (citation omitted); see, e.g., RICHARDA. POSNER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 171 (1996) (contending that the 
benefits of limited publication of opinions generally outweigh the costs of not doing 
so); Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. 
REv. 909, 921 (1986) (stating that although an opinion that is rejected for 
publication may later prove valuable, this does not of itself justify an abandonment of 
the current system of selective publication). 
12. See Letter from Circuit Judge Will L. Garniood, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Appellate Rules, to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit (Jan. 28, 1998) (on file with American University Law Review) (arguing that 
most members of the court feel strongly that some opinions should remain 
unpublisht.d); see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (stating that the Judicial Conference is 
the federal courts' policymaking arm); Martin, supra note l, at 179-80 (citations 
omitted). But cf. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding 
unpublished opinions unconstitutional), vacated en bane, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 32055 
(Dec. 18, 2000). 
13. See, e.g., Letter from Ralph K. Winter, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, to Circuit Judge Will L. Garniood, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules 
(Feb. 4, 1998) (on file with American University Law Review) ("I strongly believe that 
Courts of Appeals should be permitted to continue to designate some opinions as 
unpublished .... "); see also Memorandum re: Item No. 91-17, from Patrick:]. Schiltz, 
Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to Advisory Comm. on Appellate 
Rules (Mar. 12, 1998) (on file with American University Law Review). 
14. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 39-41 ( 1976) (arguing 
in favor of published opinions and analyzing the problems of reliance on 
unpublished opinions); Martin, supra note 1, at 180 (presenting a list of common 
criticisms of unpublished opinions); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable 
Opinion: Unpublished opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REv. 940, 946 (1989) (relating common concerns about the use 
of unpublished opinions). 
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unfairness to litigants, less judicial accountability, less 
predictability"-which scholars have leveled at judges for relying on 
these dispositions.15 
The second section of Judge Martin's article justifies the use of 
unpublished determinations because the appeals courts receive too 
many cases that lack sufficient importance.16 Judge Martin explains 
that federal jurisdiction's inexorable expansion, steady docket 
growth, and parties' enhanced willingness to appeal mean that 
caseloads have "become larger and more diluted in merit. "17 Judge 
Martin believes that none of these trends regarding input will 
change.18 Judge Martin thus broaches the possibility of modifying 
output by requiring the publication of all decisions.19 He rejects this 
prospect because it would reduce quality "by stretching judicial 
resources even more" through increases in "remarkably brief and 
uninformative, but nonetheless 'published,' opinions."20 Judge Martin 
premises these quantitative and qualitative ideas on "personal 
experience" and on anecdotes derived from his service as a law 
clerk;21 however, he bolsters other views with empirical data.22 
15. Martin, supra note 1, at 180; see, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 165-68 
(highlighting several criticisms of unpublished opinions, including lack of careful 
preparation, the suppression of opinions with high precedential value, and 
disadvantages to one-shot litigants who may have difficulty accessing unpublished 
materials); Robert Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial 
Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 120 (1995) (evaluating 
criticisms of restricting publication, namely loss of judicial accountability, the 
difficulty of appellate review, the problem of predicting precedential value, and 
inequalities of access to unpublished opinions). 
16. See Martin, supra note l, at 181-83 (addressing the problems caused by the 
volume of briefs submitted to the court); see also Nichols, supra note 11, at 919 
(arguing that the large number of federal appeals filed necessitates a selective 
publication policy). 
17. Martin, supra note l, at 183. For analysis of the first three ideas, see 
COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURlS 10-16, 44-45 (1995) [hereinafter LONG 
RANGE PLAN]; JUDITH McKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURlS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9-53 (1993). 
18. See Martin, supra note l, at 182; see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, 
REPORT OF TIIE FEDERAL COURlS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT OF 
TIIE FEDERAL COURlS STUDY COMMITTEE] (addressing the "crisis of volume" in federal 
appellate courts); Merritt, supra note 9, at 1388 (stating that parties to cases generally 
seek oral argument, even though the appellate courts are moving away from 
argument because of rising caseloads). But see WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 128-
33 (challenging the widely-held view that the increase in caseloads in the Courts of 
Appeals is attributable to an across-the-board desire to appeal). 
19. See Martin, supra note 1, at 183; see also William M. Richman & William L. 
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand 
Tradition, 81 CORNELLL. REV. 273, 339-42 (1996) (making a similar proposal). 
20. Martin, supra note l, at 183. 
21. Judges today hear more oral arguments per sitting and receive larger briefs. 
Martin reflects on his own experience as a law clerk on the Sixth Circuit by 
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The third section of Judge Martin's article offers historical material 
o~ the unpublished opinion. Judge Martin first traces its origins to a 
1964 Judicial Conference resolution, which admonished judges to 
publish only decisions that have general precedential value and to 
make the decisions succinct.23 During the 1970s, the FederalJudicial 
Center (FJC) issued a report proposing standards which recognized 
that judges must devote more resources to providing a published 
opinion than a written explanation.24 By 1974, every regional circuit 
had adopted a publication plan that prescribed guidance for issuing 
published determinations.25 Judge Martin astutely obsexves that today 
"unpublished opinion" is "a fine, almost meaningless distinction in a 
world of electronic legal research," which enables all appellate 
decisions to be published in some form.26 
Judge Martin then reviews the status of unpublished 
determinations. He obsexves that the Sixth Circuit has a 
presumption in favor of publishing opinions and against publishing 
orders.27 Judges must evaluate many factors when deciding whether 
to publish. Although the court's local rules do not mandate 
publication of determinations that overturn district court decisions or 
that include dissents or concurrences, the jurist claims that the circuit 
usually publishes reversals and opinions with dissents.28 Threejudge 
recounting that during a three-week sitting, his judge heard as many as twenty-seven 
cases, which is three cases a day, three days a week. See id. at 182. 
22. In 1945, one in forty cases was appealed, but in 1988, one in eight cases was 
appealed. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at 
llO (offering statistical data on the increase in caseloads for appellate judges); see also 
Martin, supra note l, at 183. 
23. See Martin, supra note 1, at 184 (recalling that during Judge Martin's 
clerkship in 1963-64, nearly all opinions were published, but courts were on the 
"cusp of change"); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964). 
24. See ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUS'TICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF 
JUDICIAL OPINIONS 3, 22-23 (Federal Judicial Center Research Series No. 73-2, 1973); 
see also 28 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. (1994) (authorizing the FJC as the research arm of the 
federal courts). 
25. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE LJ. 806, 808 (stating that the limited publication 
plans had the immediate effect of reducing the number of published opinions from 
48.4% to 37.2% between 1973 and 1977); see also Martin, supra note 1, at 184-85 
(arguing that the reduction in unpublished opinions would reduce the quality of the 
opinions). 
26. Martin, supra note l, at 185-86 (citation omitted); see also infra note 93 and 
accompanying text (stating that the commission report found all but three appeals 
courts make unpublished opinions available on Lexis and Westlaw). 
27. See Martin, supra note l, at 186; see also 6TH QR. R. 206(b) (formerly 6TH CIR. 
R. 24(b)) ("Designation for Publication. An opinion or order shall be designated for 
publication upon the request of any member of the panel."). 
28. See 6TH QR. R. 206(a) (formerly 6TH CIR. R. 24(a)) (providing criteria for 
publication of decisions). For example, Sixth Circuit Rule 206(a)(4) considers 
"whether [the Sixth Circuit decision] is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting 
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panels make the publication determination after oral argument and 
generally the decisions are published, unless a majority rejects 
publication; formal votes are rare and judges typically defer to any 
panel member who strongly urges publication.29 
This subsection of Judge Martin's article provides informative 
insights on appellate courts' operations. Perhaps most revealing is 
the striking inconsistency that attends the courts' reliance on 
unpublished opinions. Illustrative are the criteria that govern 
issuance of a published decision, the weight assigned unpublished 
determinations, and litigants' ability to cite them.30 Several tribunals 
specifically mandate publication when op1mons include 
concurrences or dissents or reverse published district court 
judgments.31 Others entrust publication to judicial discretion, but 
even their decisional processes vary.32 Most appeals courts permit 
nonpublication on a unanimous or majority panel vote,ss although a 
few leave the determination to individual judges' discretion34 and one 
opinion." 6rn CIR. R 206(a)(4). Rule 206(a)(5) considers "whether [the Sixth 
Circuit decision] reverses the decision below .... " 6rn CIR. R 206(a) (5); see also 
Martin, supra note 1, at 186-87 (stating that "[i]t is fair to say that reversals or 
OJ?inions with dissents are almost always published" in the Sixth Circuit); Reynolds & 
Richman, supra note 25, at 810-14, 821-33 (affording history of publication of 
decisions in the Sixth Circuit); infra note 115 and accompanying text (examining 
Judge Martin's assertion that reversals and opinions with dissent are usually 
published). 
29. See Martin, supra note 1, at 187-88. The Sixth Circuit has no mechanism for 
litigants to submit publication requests, but some courts do. See id. at 188; see also 4rn 
CIR. R 36(b) ("Counsel may move for publication of an unpublished opinion, citing 
reasons. If such motion is granted, the unpublished opinion will be published 
without change in result."); 11rn CIR. R 36-3 (providing that, upon motion by a 
party, the panel may by unanimous vote order a previously unpublished decision to 
be published). 
30. See Martin, supra note l, at 186-88. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, The 
Balkanization of Appellate justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing procedural variances from court to court). 
31. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R 36(a) (providing that the court publishes "opinions and 
explanatory memoranda that have general public interest," i.e., cases of first 
impression, or if reversing a "published agency or district court decision"); 9TII CIR. 
R 36-2 (providing the criteria necessary for the publication of an opinion, including 
if it includes a concurrence or a dissent); see also Martin, supra note 1, at 187. 
32. Compare 4TII CIR. R 36(b) (affording the court discretion to provide limited 
explanations without facts or background, but providing no guidance as to which 
opinions should be published), with 8TII CIR. RAPP. I (allowing a court to decide 
whether to publish an opinion and providing scenarios when publishing an opinion 
would be appropriate), and Martin, supra note 1, at 187 n.46 (discussing the collegial 
way Sixth Circuit judges determine whether to publish an opinion). See also Reynolds 
& Richman, supra note 25, at 810-14, 821-33 (providing history of the publication 
decision in the Fourth Circuit). 
33. See, e.g., lsr CIR. R 36.2(b) (stating that panel members shall discuss and 
decide the publication status of a case); 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (according the majority of 
the panel the authority to determine publication status); see also Martin, supra note 1, 
at 187 (discussing the panel decision regarding publication in the Sixth Circuit). 
34. See supra note 32 (comparing appeals court practices). 
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allows nonpublication unless a majority choos.es to publish.35 
The third subpart examines the prevalence of unpublished 
opinions. Judge Martin finds historical data on their numbers scarce; 
however, he does muster some information.36 The author consults 
current material on unpublished decisions maintained by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Administrative 
Office), the federal courts' administrative arm, and claims that the 
Sixth Circuit approximates the national average by issuing 
unpublished dispositions in seventy-nine percent of its cases.37 
Section four of Judge Martin's article supplies practical and policy 
justifications for using unpublished opinions. First, selective 
publication has the pragmatic benefit· of increasing the courts' 
productivity.38 The writer asserts that he and his clerks spend about 
half the time on an average unpublished decision as a published 
opinion because the unpublished decision is fact-driven, requires 
only four typewritten pages, and implicates clear points oflaw.39 "The 
relative straightforwardness of the legal questions in an unpublished 
opinion also saves research time," as the issues' recurring nature 
reduces the need for novel research.40 The author admonishes that 
practicality is only one, and never a dispositive, element as the 
publication decision is merit-based.41 Second, Judge Martin 
enunciates a policy rationale. He contends that courts must 
distinguish "opinions worthy of publication, and of making a 
meaningful contribution" to precedent, from ones that "merely apply 
35. See ll1H aR. R. 36-2 ("An opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority of 
the panel decides to publish it."); see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1386 (finding 
similar diversity among Courts of Appeals in decisions about whether to publish an 
opinion); Nichols, supra note ll, at 924-27 (same); Martin, supra note 1, at 188 
(stating that in the Sixth Circuit, "[o]pinions are published unless a majority of the 
panel votes against publication"). 
36. See Martin, supra note 1, at 188-89; see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 
25, at 814-16 (providing historical data on the Fourth and Sixth Circuits). 
37. See Martin, supra note l, at 189 (citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 601 et 
seq. (1994) (authorizing the Administrative Office). 
38. See Martin, supra note 1, at 189-91; see also Nichols, supra note ll, at 927-28 
(contending that selective publication avoids the "absurdity of destroying forests to 
distribute masses of prolix and repetitious material"). 
39. See Martin, supra note l, at 189-91; see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1392 
(asserting that publishing every opinion provides only marginal benefits); Reynolds 
& Richman, supra note 25, at 816-21 (analyzing opinions' length and the time to 
produce them). 
40. Martin, supra note 1, at 190 (finding that the legal questions are easily 
answered after many years on the bench and assuming that his "colleagues have the 
same experience"). 
41. See id. at 191 (claiming that the decision to publish is based on the merits of 
each case with the practical benefits of saving paper and library space seldom 
factoring into the consideration); see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 25, at 807-
08 (surveying practical rationales). 
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settled law to decide a dispute between parties."42 This differentiation 
maintains a cohesive, understandable corpus oflaw, and emphasizing 
important appeals responds to the information explosion.43 The 
Sixth Circuit resolves seven percent of argued cases without opinion 
from the bench, but Judge Martin finds the number too high and 
claims that most litigants "deserve a cogent, written explanation."44 
He calls for sharply restricted party citation to unpublished 
determinations because this will maintain the decisions' non-
precedential status: "as strongly as I believe in the production of 
unpublished opinions, I am just as adamantly opposed" to their 
citation.45 Judge Martin asserts that precluding citation conserves the 
research time of judges and litigants and minimizes any remaining 
unfairness that may result from parties' unequal access to 
unpublished determinations by limiting the creation of a secret body 
oflaw.46 
Judge Martin urges that his Sixth Circuit colleagues tighten the 
local rules that govern citation to provide that "unpublished opinions 
have no precedential value and are not even the least bit 
persuasive."47 The jurist lacks "encyclopedic knowledge" of 
publication practices but believes that he possesses sufficient 
familiarity to state that the court permits rather liberal citation.48 His 
42. See Martin, supra note 1, at 189; see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1392 
(asserting that only case law expounding or creating new law warrants publication). 
43. See Martin, supra note l, at 191-92 (insisting that judges can make this 
distinction "in an extremely high percentage of the casesh); see also Nichols, supra 
note 11, at 924 (maintaining thatjudges sometimes err in deciding to publish or not 
to publish their decision, but that these errors are not so extensive that the selective 
publication system should be abandoned). 
44. See Martin, supra note 1, at 192-93 (citation omitted); see also id. at 193 n.69 
(stating that the Second Circuit is the only other court that employs this practice and 
only in a few appeals); Merritt, supra note 9, at 1386, 1394 (explaining history of the 
practice in the Sixth Circuit); lleynolds & Richman, supra note 25, at 807-08 
(surveying policy rationales); 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (providing for disposition of cases in 
court or by summary ord:er); 6rn CIR. R. 19 (allowing a panel to dispose of a case in 
open court after oral argument if every judge on the panel believes there is no 
jurisprudential purpose to providing a written opinion). 
45. Martin, supra note 1, at 193 (stating that "[t]his is the gravamen of this 
articleh); see also Nichols, supra note 11, at 928 (maintaining that the "prohibition 
against citing unpublished material should be maintained, and those materials 
should continue to be nonprecedential"). 
46. See Martin, supra note 1, at 194-97 (arguing that citing unpublished decisions 
creates a larger body of law which is less accessible and results in research being 
more difficult and more expensive). 
47. Id. at 194-95. Several courts so provide. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 28(c) (stating 
that unpublished orders, judgments and dispositions shall not be cited as 
precedent); 5TI:I CIR. R. 47.5.4 (stating that unpublished decisions are "not 
precedent, except under the doctrine ofres judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the 
case," but may still be persuasive). 
48. See Martin, supra note 1, at 194. Some courts also permit liberal citation. See, 
e.g., lOTI:I CIR. R. 30.3 (allowing unpublished opinions to be cited as persuasive 
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survey of many tribunals' strictures once again shows the great 
disparity because, for example, some allow citation for various 
purposes, even as others explicitly provide that unpublished 
dispositions lack any precedential value.49 
B. Critical Analysis 
Judge Martin significantly enhances understanding of the Sixth 
Circuit through the lens of unpublished decisions and two decades of 
experience. Perhaps most important, the judge perceptively reveals 
the enormous discrepancies in system-wide publication practices. He 
specifically finds that the Sixth Circuit's use of unpublished opinions 
approximates the national average50 while opining that the tribunal 
assigns the determinations too much weight and permits their overly 
frequent citation.51 
The jurist provides numerous instructive insights on how the Sixth 
Circuit functions that he derives primarily from practical, daily 
dispute resolution. Judge Martin seems to ·state expressly, or at least 
strongly implies, that he believes the court operates effectively by, for 
instance, providing published decisions in appeals that merit them52 
and delivering appellate justice by, for example, promptly, 
economically, and fairly treating cases.53 The writer apparently 
admits, however, that the appeals courts fail to attain the appellate 
ideal: merit-based disposition of every appeal after full briefing and 
oral argument, close consultation among three active circuit judges, 
authority, but as not binding precedent); llTH CIR .. R. 36-2 (same). 
49. See Martin, supra note l, at 194-95 (explaining the use of unpublished 
decisions by some appeals courts and problems resulting from this use); see also 
Merritt, supra note 9, at 1386 (finding similar diversity among Courts of Appeals 
concerning citation of unpublished opinions). 
50. See Martin, supra note l, at 189 (positing that the national average for 
unpublished decisions for cases terminated on the merits after oral hearing or 
submission on briefs in 1995-1996 was 76% while the Sixth Circuit average was 
78.9%). 
51. See id. at 194 (noting that the Sixth Circuit liberally uses unpublished 
decisions). 
52. See id. at 191 (maintaining that, although unpublished opinions save time, 
publication decisions are based primarily on the merits). The Commission finds that 
every appeals court so operates and seems to define this idea in terms of satisfactory 
performance vis-a-vis the parameters that it assessed. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 2, at ix-xi, 29-30; infra notes 70-94 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Commission's findings). 
53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the rules of the U.S. district courts shall 
secure a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination"); see also Patrick Johnston, 
Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure l, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1325, 1331-92 (1995) (commenting on the construction 
of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to ensure a sreedy trial); Carl 
Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 8 CORNELL L. REV. 
1264, 1286n.90 (1996) (discussing Rule 1). 
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and issuance of a published opinion that thoroughly explicates the 
decision reached.54 Indeed, too great reliance on unpublished 
determinations could be one telling indicator that a tribunal 
performs less efficaciously than it might and may not be dispensing 
justice, while widespread dependence on these opinions shows that 
modern courts no longer even aspire to achieve this ideal.55 
Despite Judge Martin's valuable contributions to understanding 
the Sixth Circuit, he incompletely describes the court. In fairness, 
the judge does not purport to afford a comprehensive account of 
circuit performance, and the jurist candidly concedes that he 
premises many perceptions on practical experience, personal 
knowledge, and anecdotes, rather than empirical data that has been 
systematically collected, assessed, and synthesized.56 For instance, 
readers profit from knowing that the tribunal resolves seven percent 
of argued appeals orally57 and from Judge Martin's opinion that he 
and his colleagues can correctly identify cases that should be 
published, that the judges rarely differ on this determination,58 and 
that selective publication improves productivity.59 However, these 
and other ideas that Judge Martin expresses are controversial and 
critics have contested several of them, although much that the jurist 
states is empirically verifiable or at least could be informed by 
carefully assembled empirical data.60 More specifically, it is difficult 
to ascertain whether courts' publication determinations are accurate 
without evaluating the legal and factual issues posed in many specific 
appeals to determine whether the issuance of published dispositions 
would have improved dispute resolution. Regardless of how 
instructive unpublished decisions are in fact, they cannot seive as a 
surrogate for overall circuit operations, which range across a broad 
spectrum as concrete as courthouse construction and as abstract as 
circuit law's coherence. 
54. See, e.g., BAKER, sufrra note 10, at 1430 (outlining the ideal adjudicative 
process for appeals courts); REPORT OF TiiE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, sufrra 
note 18, at 109 (highlighting some of the hallmarks of our appellate justice system). 
55. See sources cited sufrra note 54; Merritt, supra note 9, at 1388 (suggesting that 
oral arguments afforded can serve as a measure of a court's health). 
56. See Martin, sufrra note 1, at 186 (relating judge Martin's observations of the 
manner in which the Sixth Circuit addresses cases). 
57. See id. at 193. 
58. See id. at 190-91. 
59. See id. at 190. 
60. See infra notes 126-51 and accompanying text (supporting the idea that 
certain information, including some information that Judge Martin and the 
Commission produced, cannot support definitive conclusions); see also supra notes 
1415 and accompanying text (contesting some of Judge Martin's views and 
methods). 
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In short, the limited empirical data that Judge Martin supplies and 
his somewhat narrow focus on unpublished opinions restrict efforts 
to determine with confidence how well the Sixth Circuit actually 
functions. This Essay's second section, therefore, consults the work 
of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 
of Appeals to ascertain whether its empirical nature or breadth 
permits more definitive conclusions. 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK 
A. Descriptive Analysis 
1. Authorization of the Commission and a description of its work 
The history of the Commission requires relatively little evaluation 
here, as the background has been rather thoroughly assessed 
elsewhere.61 Nonetheless, some treatment is warranted because this 
can enhance appreciation of the Commission's endeavor while 
facilitating comparison with Judge Martin's In Defense of Unpublished 
opinions62 and the formulation of more certain determinations 
related to the Sixth Circuit. 
The genesis of the Commission was a lengthy dispute that 
principally implicates the large size of the Ninth Circuit. Since 1983, 
there have been many attempts to restructure the court; however, in 
1997, Congress authorized a study of the appellate system, which was 
to emphasize this tribunal.63 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
chose as commissioners retired United States Supreme Court Justice 
Byron R White, Sixth CircuitJudge Gilbert S. Merritt, Ninth Circuit 
Judge Pamela Ann Rymer, District Judge William D. Browning of 
Arizona, and immediate past American Bar Association (ABA) 
President N. Lee Cooper.64 
61. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-6 (discussing the creation, mission, 
and activities of the Commission). Other authors have discussed relevant 
background material relating to the Commission. See, e.g., Procter Hug, Jr., The 
Commission on Structural Alternatives fqr the Federal Courts of Atpeals' Final Repm: An 
Ana~sis of the Commission '.s Recommendations fqr the Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
887 (1999) (outlining the Commission's draft report and arguing against a 
reconfiguration of the Ninth Circuit);Jennifer Spreng, Three Divisions in One Circuit? 
A Critique of the Recommendations from the Commission on Structural Alternatives f qr the 
Federal Court of Appeals, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 551 (1999) (listing and discussing the 
Commission recommendations); Carl Tobias, Suggestions fqr Studying the Federal 
Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REv. 189 (1997) (recommending specific modes of study 
for the Commission). 
62. See Martin, supra note 1. 
63. See infra note 64 (discussing the formation of the Commission). 
64. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 92 app. B (listing the Commission 
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During 1998, the commissioners sought much relevant information 
in six public hearings, in smveys of appeals and district judges and 
appellate attorneys, and in studies performed by the Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC) staff. The Commission specifically gathered material 
regarding the courts' work. For example, it assembled data on the 
percentage of appeals that the appellate courts afforded oral 
argmnents and published opinions, on the time that the tribunals 
need to resolve cases, and on the measures that the courts use to 
address the steadily growing dockets which have dramatically 
changed them since the 1970s.65 
The Commission analyzed all of the information that it had 
accumulated or had received, and on October 7, 1998, the 
commissioners issued a tentative . draft report and suggestions for 
which they solicited public comment over a thirty-day period.66 Few 
people who responded or testified at the earlier hearings were judges 
of, or practiced before, the Sixth Circuit, although a tiny number of 
witnesses or submissions expressly mentioned this tribunal.67 After 
the Commission reviewed the public input, the entity made minimal 
changes and issued a final report that essentially recommended a 
divisional arrangement for the Ninth Circuit and the other courts as 
they grow.68 The commissioners also collected valuable empirical 
members and their relevant biographical information); see also Departments of 
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997). The Act assigned 
the Chief Justice of the United States the power to appoint five members to the 
Commission and assigned the Commission three functions: · 
(i) study the present division of the United States into the several judicial 
circuits; 
(ii) study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals 
system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit; and 
(iii) report to the President and the Congress its recommendations for such 
changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the 
expeditious and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process. 
Id.§ 305(a) (1) (B), § 305(a) (2) (A). 
65. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-25, 39 (examining two recent 
innovations in the federal appellate courts: the adoption of differentiated decisional 
processes and the use of central staff attorneys); see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at 109 (stating that caseload increases have 
transformed the circuits). 
66. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS, TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT (Oct. 7, 1998), available at http:/ /app.comm. 
uscourts.gov I report/ appstruc.pdf. · 
67. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS, PuBUC HEARINGS AND TEsTIMONY (Mar. 19, 1999), available at http:/ /app. 
comm.uscourts.gov/schedule.htm (providing witness lists and testimony from all 
hearings, including testimony submitted by persons who did no,t appear at the public 
hearings). 
68. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 57 (recommending that it is better 
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data on the Sixth Circuit.69 
2. Commission data on the Sixth Circuit 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is in the 
middle or upper range of the appeals courts based on numerous, 
applicable considerations, all involving size but only one of which 
measures performance. The circuit seives the second biggest 
population (30 million people), encompasses the fifth largest 
geographic area (178,000 square miles), ties three courts for the 
third highest number of federal districts (9), has the third largest 
complement of active appellate judges (16), equals two other 
tribunals for the third largest number of district judges ( 62), annually 
receives the sixth greatest number of cases ( 4,600), and each year 
resolves the fifth highest number of appeals ( 4,600). 70 
Throughout the 1997 fiscal year, members of the Sixth Circuit 
decided 2,100 cases on the merits, which was the fifth largest statistic 
in the appellate system.71 The court concomitantly terminated 132 
appeals on the merits per authorized active judgeship, as compared 
to the national average of 155.12 This meant that the Sixth Circuit 
concluded the seventh highest number of cases per authorized 
judgeship.73 
During the 1997 fiscal year, judges of the Sixth Circuit granted oral 
arguments in fifty percent of the appeals in which the court resolved 
the issue on the merits.74 The figure was considerably higher than the 
system-wide average of forty percent, was surpassed only in the First, 
Second and Seventh Circuits and was twenty percentage points 
greater than the numbers compiled by the Third, Fourth, Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits, . which conducted oral arguments in only thirty 
fth . 75 percent o eir cases. 
For the 1997 fiscal year, Sixth Circuit judges issued published 
for California, which contributes the most to the caseload of the Ninth Circuit, to be 
subject to division within the same circuit than to be split between two circuits, which 
would divide the common body oflaw on issues important in the Pacific Rim). 
69. See id. at 13-14 (describing the research and analyses performed by the 
Commission). 
70. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 27, tbl. 2-9 (listing the circuit 
population, size, composition, and number of judgeships for the appeals courts); 
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93, tbl. 1 (listing the number of appellate 
judgeships, appeals filed, and appeals terminated by any method). The data listed in 
the Essay are for the 1997 fiscal year, unless otherwise indicated. 
71. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93, tbl. 1. 
72. Seeid. 
73. Seeid. 
74. See id. at 93, tbl. 2. 
75. Seeid. 
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opinions in eighteen percent of the appeals that the court decided 
on the merits.76 This statistic was five percentage points beneath the 
national average and was higher than only the Third, Fourth, and 
Eleventh Circuits.77 In the 1997 fiscal year, members of the Sixth 
Circuit correspondingly terminated twenty-four percent of the cases 
on the merits after oral argument.78 The figure was two percent 
greater than the system-wide average and higher than seven other 
courts.79 
Throughout the 1997 fiscal year, thirty-four percent of threejudge 
panels that concluded cases after oral argument in the Sixth Circuit 
included at least one visiting appellate or district court judge, while 
only eight of the 168 panels constituted had three active Sixth Circuit 
members.80 The thirty-four percent figure was one point above the 
national average and was the sixth largest.81 By way of comparison, 
zero and sixty-four percent of threejudge panels assembled 
respectively in the District of Columbia and Eleventh Circuits had a 
participant who was not an active member of the appellate court. 82 
Between the 1995 and 1997 fiscal years in the Sixth Circuit, the 
median time interval for counseled, civil, non-prisoner cases that the 
court resolved after hearing or submission was sixteen months from 
the notice of appeal to final disposition.83 The Sixth Circuit was 
slower than every other court, except the Ninth Circuit which needed 
18.2 months, while the systemwide average during this period was 
12.4 months.84 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit ranked tenth for one and 
eleventh for two other indicia that the commissioners used in 
calculating time to disposition, even though the court was faster than 
the national average vis-a-vis the remaining two parameters.85 
The Commission compiled additional material that implicates 
management practices.86 The entity considered distinctive virtually 
76. See id. at 93, tbl. 3. This confirms the figure that Judge Martin supplied. See 
supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (stating thatJudge Martin found the Sixth 
Circuit issued unpublished decisions approximately 80% of the time). 
77. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93, tbl. 3. 
78. See id. at 94, tbl. 5. 
79. Seeid. 
80. See id. at 108, tbl. 6a (providing a 34% figure); CHARLES E. GRASSLE¥, 
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, ANALYSIS OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 3 (1999) (asserting that 
eight out of 168 panels had three active Sixth Circuit members). 
81. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 108, tbl. 6a. 
82. Seeid. 
83. See id. at 95, tbl. 7. 
84. Seeid. 
85. Seeid. 
86. See id. at 101-16 (summarizing management practices within the existing 
appeals courts}. 
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no aspect of Sixth Circuit operations involving staff organization and 
general duties, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), case screening, 
and non-argument decisionmaking. For example, the court, as all 
circuits, uses a "mediation or conference program to resolve some 
appeals by settlement, with little or no judicial inteivention"87 and, 
like most tribunals, does not employ judges to screen cases for oral 
argument.88 
The Commission also provided info~ation on important issues 
regarding opinions and publication. It found different publication 
rates across tribunals, but relatively consistent ''formal criteria that 
courts say govern their decisions about what to publish."89 Between 
the 1995 and 1997 fiscal years, the Sixth Circuit compiled figures 
measuring opinion publication, which were respectively twenty, 
seventeen, and twelve percentage points lower than the system-wide 
average for orally argued appeals for decisions with a dissent and for 
reversals.90 The Commission concomitantly obseived that the courts 
have long followed diverse traditions for publishing and that all 
tribunals "(except D.C.) have, since 1987, even further reduced their 
publication rates."91 The Sixth Circuit published twenty-two percent 
of its merit terminations in 1987, a statistic that declined to seventeen 
percent by 1993 and remained constant at eighteen percent in 1997.92 
The Commission correspondingly reported that every court, except 
the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, makes unpublished opinions 
available on LEXIS and Westlaw.93 Moreover, the entity found 
"substantial variation" in courts' practices and policies respecting the 
citability of unpublished decisions but "no significant disuniformity of 
procedure among" tribunals allowing citation for any persuasive value 
it might have.94 
87. Id. at 102. See generally JAMES B. EAGLIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE PRE-
ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH QRCUIT COURT OF .APPEALS: AN 
EVALUATION 1 (1990) (listing the three purposes behind Sixth Circuit Local Rule 18: 
"(l) explore settlement possibilities, (2) resolve procedural issues, and (3) clarify 
issues in the appeal"); ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MEDIATION AND 
CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF .APPEALS 52-57 (1997) (describing 
the pre-argument conference program for the Sixth Circuit). 
88. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 103-04. 
89. Id. at 110. 
90. Seeid. 
91. Id. at 111-12. 
92. See id. at 112, tbl. 10. 
93. Id. at 112; see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1392-93 (describing criticisms that 
arise when opinions are reported on LEXIS and Westlaw but not in the official 
reporters, including "the definitional problem of what is an opinion," but noting the 
limited availability of unpublished opinions). 
94. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 112. Sixth Circuit appellants, district 
judges and appellate attorneys surveyed by the Commission seemed relatively 
satisfied with the court's consistency and predictability as well as with the court's 
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3. A closer comparison of the Sixth Circuit with other courts 
My critical analysis addresses major difficulties that complicate 
efforts to reach definitive determinations about any court's 
performance.95 For example, the material collected by the 
Commission apparently lacks certain qualities, such as sufficient 
comprehensiveness and refinement to sustain concrete conclusions.96 
Despite those problems, this Essay evaluates the Sixth Circuit by 
attempting to provide for the difficulties and by comparing its 
performance with that of other tribunals using the factors for which 
the Commission assembled information. 
Consideration of all the material above indicates that the court 
functions less well than it might. Instructive examples include the 
rather few appeals that the court terminates on the merits per 
authorized active judgeship, the relatively low percentage of cases 
that receive published opinions, the comparatively high percentage 
of visiting judges whom the tribunal employs, and the statistics that 
involve most of the criteria deployed in assessing time to disposition.97 
Even when the Sixth Circuit attains or approximates the national 
average, as the court does respectively for two indicia regarding speed 
of resolution and percentage of visitors, the tribunal compiles 
numbers that only differ minimally from this systemic figure.98 
The above criteria are valuable measures of efficacious operation 
and appellate justice principally because they involve important 
process values such as broad court access.99 The rather low 
percentage of published opinions issued specifically suggests that the 
Sixth Circuit might work more ineffectively, and dispense less justice, 
overall performance. See id. at 19-21, 23-24, 47 (summarizing the results of a 1998 
FJC survey of circuit and district judges). 
95. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (analyzing the incompleteness 
of Judge Martin's explanation of the publication decision process in the Sixth 
Circuit). 
96. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (noting the lack of empirical 
data to support some conclusions about courts' decisions not to publish). 
97. See supra notes 72-73, 76-77, 80-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating the 
large number of cases decided in the Sixth Circuit, the high number of unpublished 
cases, and the court's need for visitingjudges to meet its scheduling demands). 
98. See supra notes 80-81, 85 (showing that the Sixth Circuit was one of the lowest-
ranked courts in terms of speed of case resolution). 
99. See generally ROBERT COVER & OWEN Flss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 
(1979); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Cost of Complexity and Complex Litigation, 85 
MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1467-68 (discussing process values); Martha]. Dragich, 'Will the 
Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to 
Explain and justify JudicialDecisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 775-76 
(1995) (arguing that public access to judicial opinions "allow[s] citizens to act 
lawfully, enable[s) parties to determine when litigation is appropriate, permit[s] trial 
courts to reach correct results in most cases, and ensure[s] that appellate courts can 
decide future cases fairly and efficiently"). 
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than the court could, as publication can increase judicial 
accountability and visibility as well as fairness to parties. The Sixth 
Circuit does perform relatively well in terms of some parameters, 
however. Most important, the court holds oral arguments in half of 
the appeals concluded on the merits, a number ten percentage 
points higher than the national average and twenty points greater 
than four tribunals.100 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit seems to be 
functioning less efficaciously than it might and than numerous other 
courts, vis-a-vis the objective data gathered by the Commission. 
It might be useful to compare the tribunal with courts that operate 
more or less well in terms of these indicators. The First and Seventh 
Circuits apparently perform best. The First Circuit decides the 
largest percentage of cases on the merits in which there is oral 
argument and that result in published opinions,101 while the Seventh 
Circuit compiles the third and second highest percentages 
respectively for these measures.102 The First Circuit also terminates 
cases most quickly from the notice of appeal to final disposition and 
from last brief to hearing or submission.103 The Seventh Circuit ties 
another court as the second fastest from notice of appeal to last brief, 
although a minuscule one percent of its panels includes visitors.104 
The tribunals do not operate as effectively, however, in terms of every 
criterion. For instance, only two courts resolve fewer appeals per 
authorized judgeship than the First Circuit,105 and the Seventh Circuit 
decides cases rather slowly in terms of certain factors. 106 In short, this 
review leaves uncertain which court is best, although both seem to 
100. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (noting that the Sixth Circuit is. 
more likely than other circuits to grant oral arguments in cases decided on their 
merits); see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1388 (suggesting that one valid measure of 
the health of the appellate decisionmaking process is the percentage of cases argued 
orally). The figure may reflect the attention that the court devotes to some appeals 
and explain why it resolves rather few cases per authorized judgeship. 
101. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93-94, this. 2 & 5. 
102. See id. at 93, tbl. 2. Indeed, the two tribunals issue published opinions in 
more than twice the percentage of appeals as the national average and exceed 
virtually all of the remaining courts. See id. 
103. See id. at 95, tbl. 7. The First and D.C. Circuits tie in the second category. 
The median time interval from last brief to hearing or submission is 1.7 months for 
both of these courts, while the Sixth Circuit's median interval is 8.6 months. Id. 
104. See id. at 95, tbl. 7 (presenting statistics concerning median time intervals); id. 
at 108, tbl. 6a (presenting statistics on number of visiting judges participating in 
decisions). A quarter of the First Circuit panels had visitors. See id. 
105. See id. at 93, tbl. 1. The First Circuit decided a total of 116 appeals per 
authorized judgeship in 1997. Id. The Tenth Circuit decided 115, and the D.C. 
Circuit, whose docket includes many administrative appeals, decided 61 appeals in 
1997. Id. 
106. See id. at 95, tbl. 7. These aspects of both courts' performance might explain 
how each is able to furnish so many published opinions and why the First Circuit is so 
prompt. 
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work better than the other courts of ~ppeals. 
It may also be helpful to contrast Sixth Circuit operations with 
those of courts that function rather poorly vis-a-vis the objective 
indicators. The comparison suggests that the Third, Fourth, and 
Eleventh Circuits apparently perform least well. They are among the 
four tribunals resolving the lowest percentages of appeals on the 
merits in which oral argument is conducted107 and hearing the largest 
percentages of cases with visitors, 108 even though the three courts 
write the smallest percentages of published opinions.109 Indeed, the 
Eleventh Circuit has the greatest percentage ofvisitingjudges-sixty-
four-a number almost two times the national average and twenty-
one points higher than any other court.110 The parameters are 
significant measures for determining whether tribunals work 
efficaciously and dispense justice. The three courts do function 
comparatively well in terms of some indicia. For example, the Third 
and Fourth Circuits are among the tribunals that most expeditiously 
decide appeals vis-a-vis certain factors for measuring time to 
disposition.111 The Eleventh Circuit also terminates substantially 
more cases on the merits per authorized judgeship than all of the 
courts: the tribunal's statistic is 275, the Fifth Circuit is second with 
202 and the system-wide average is 155.112 
In the final analysis, the Sixth Circuit may not function as well as it 
could, and apparently delivers less justice than the tribunal might, 
particularly when compared to the remaining courts. Were the 
twelve tribunals placed on a spectrum, the Sixth Circuit would be 
closer, and probably next, to the three which seem to operate least 
effectively. For instance, the Sixth Circuit affords a rather small 
percentage of published opinions, decides comparatively few appeals 
per authorized judgeship, relies substantially on visitors, and ·resolves 
cases quite slowly vis-a-vis several measures.113 
107. See id. at93, tbl. 2. 
108. See id. at 108, tbl. 6a. 
109. See id. at 93, tbl. 3. The Third and Eleventh Circuits provide fewer than one-
third the percentage of published opinions as the First Circuit, and the Fourth 
Circuit issues less than one-quarter of that court's percentage. See id. 
110. See id. at 108, tbl. 6a. A high percentage of prose cases may also explain the 
statistic, but a few circuits receive larger percentages and absolute numbers of pro se 
cases. See id. at 93, tbl. 1. 
111. See id. at 95, tbl. 7. The small percentages of oral arguments and published 
opinions afforded and the large number of visitors used may explain rather prompt 
resolution. 
112. See id. at 93, tbl. 1. The Eleventh Circuit figure might mean that active 
appellate judges of the court grant these cases comparatively limited attention. 
113. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text (explaining these factors). 
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4. Other insights on the Sixth Circuit 
The Commission's material provides numerous, informative 
perspectives on the contemporary Sixth Circuit and the appellate 
system. Most relevant to the issues treated here, some information 
reaffirms, substantiates or elucidates concepts that other observers, 
especially Judge Martin, have illuminated. For example, the material 
confirms the percentage of published opinions that the Sixth Circuit 
affords and the diverse publication practices that courts follow, in 
attempting to address the docket growth that has transformed the 
tribunals.114 The information also questions or clarifies certain 
notions propounded by Judge Martin. For instance, the Sixth Circuit 
apparently affords published opinions in appeals that involve 
reversals and dissents somewhat less frequently than the author 
suggests. 115 
B. Critical Anafysis 
The Commission substantially increases understanding of the Sixth 
Circuit, particularly by providing much relevant empirical data which 
reaffirms, complements, or elaborates Judge Martin's account. 
Notwithstanding this important contribution, the Commission's 
effort, in conjunction with Judge Martin's article, is insufficiently 
broad or refined to support conclusive determinations about the 
court's condition. For example, the empirical data on the 
percentages of oral arguments afforded and the percentages of 
visitingjudges employed, considered alone, lack enough applicability. 
Knowing only that the Sixth Circuit relies on unpublished decisions 
to terminate nearly eighty percent of its appeals is similarly 
uninstructive, absent comparison with the figures compiled by other 
courts.116 Even consultation of the raw numbers for every appellate 
court may be unilluminating, as caseload complexity and appeals' 
treatment can vary significantly among the courts.117 For instance, 
one tribunal might receive many pro se cases and choose to address 
the docket by affording a high percentage of oral arguments and a 
low percentage of published opinions, while another court could 
114. Compare supra text accompanying note 38, with supra text accompanying notes 
76,92. 
115. Compare supra text accompanying note 28, with supra text accompanying note 
90. 
116. See generally WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4 (comparing the various appeals 
courts by studying the structure and alignment of the federal appellate system). 
117. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 16, this. 2-4, 2-5; at 24, tbl. 2-8; at 
27, tbl. 2-9; McKENNA, supra note 17, at 31-32; Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About 
Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 389, 395 (1997). 
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have substantially fewer pro se appeals and elect to resolve its 
caseload in the opposite manner, yet each tribunal may perform 
efficaciously. 
C. Summary By Way of Transition 
In sum, the ideas expressed by Judge Martin, especially together 
with the information that the Commission adduced, improve 
comprehension of the modern. Sixth Circuit.· However, Judge 
Martin's article and the commissioners' work, in combination, do not 
show with adequate clarity that the court's situation is problematic 
enough to deserve remediation. Accordingly, the third section of this 
essay offers suggestions for the future. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTuRE 
The above assertion that the Sixth Circuit's circumstances remain 
unclear could make the court reluctant to act; however, the tribunal 
need not eschew all possibilities. For example, the Sixth Circuit may 
examine some of the ideas expressed by Judge Martin in addition to 
the Commission material and other existing information as a prelude 
to its own study; it might experiment with salutary approaches, 
including proposals proffered by the judge and the Commission; and 
it could employ other measures that have promise. The court's 
scrutiny of this material, its own condition and that of the remaining 
tribunals may correspondingly improve circuit operations. 
An expert, independent entity might assume primary responsibility 
for the analysis. The Circuit Judicial Council, the governing body, 
however, could assemble a group premised on the Ninth Circuit 
Evaluation Committee.118 Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., of that court, 
recently appointed this entity to reassess circuit operations in 
response to the commissioners' work and to develop constructive 
suggestions for improvement.119 A similar Sixth Circuit committee 
should include Judge Martin and Judge Gilbert Merritt. Each jurist 
might draw on his service as chief judge and his experience on the 
court for two decades, while Judge Merritt could invoke his 
experience as a Commission member and chair of the Judicial 
118. See Hearings on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Intell.ectual 
Property, 106th Cong. 61-66 (1999) (statement of Ninth Circuit Judge David 
Thompson) (discussing the panel's process, findings and recommendations). 
119. See NINTII CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT (2000). See 
generall.y Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferahk Approach for the Ninth Circuit, 88 
CAL. L. REv. 1657-71 (2000) (discussing the work and conclusions of the Ninth 
Circuit Evaluation Committee). 
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Conference Executive Committee.120 
A. Additional Study 
The court should carefully collect, analyze, and synthesize the 
maximum empirical data, which will show as conclusively as possible 
whether its situation is sufficiently troubling to require treatment. 
The Sixth Circuit must closely consult and capitalize on available 
applicable material, particularly the valuable perspectives of Judge 
Martin and the Commission,121 while attempting to resolve difficult, 
unanswered questions. If evaluators definitively conclude that the 
court needs attention, they should institute efforts to identify 
precisely why and to delineate the best remedies. 
Assessors could seek the ideas of appeals and district judges and 
appellate attorneys on controversial issues raised by the writer or the 
comm1ss1oners. For instance, evaluators may want to interview 
counsel for insights on the author's claim that the tribunal properly 
designates appeals that do not merit publication. They might inquire 
about matters that the Commission analyzes by, for example, 
interviewing: appellate judges for input on collegiality and whether 
selective publication improves productivity, district judges for 
opinions on circuit law's predictability, and lawyers for views on 
dispositions' speed, expense, and fairness. Assessors should also 
follow other approaches, however, because these obsenrers' self-
interest and experiences could intrinsically limit the accuracy of their 
ideas. 
Evaluators thus may want to track specific cases from filing to 
resolution. This query can illuminate whether the court correctly 
identifies appeals that desenre to be published. Integral to these 
inquiries will be determining whether the provision of unpublished 
opinions with written determinations explicating the results suffices 
for parties and maintains uniform, coherent, certain and predictable 
circuit law.122 These are difficult, and possibly intractable, questions, 
120. See supra note 64 (listing the members of Commission on Structural 
Alternatives, which was charged, among other things, with examining the structure 
of the Ninth Circuit); see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1386 (stating the author's 
intent to address criticisms of the judicial decisionmaking process by drawing 
primarily upon his experience with the Sixth Circuit); infra note 132 and 
accompanying text (discussingjudge Merritt's proposal in the Commission report to 
limit federal civil or criminal jurisdiction in ah effort to reduce the number of 
appeals). 
121. The Sixth Circuit Executive Office, the FJC and the Administrative Office are 
obvious sources. 
122. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-45, 39-40, 47-49. Evaluators might 
also probe whether rulings from the bench afford an adequate basis for litigants to 
perfect appeals and for judges to reflect on decisions. See Merritt, supra note 9, at 
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but separate, recent studies of consistency and the en bane process 
may offer instructive guidance.123 
Assessors could concomitantly attempt to discern why the Sixth 
Circuit ranked tenth or below for four of the six parameters 
employed by the Commission in evaluating time to disposition, how 
the court compiled one of the lowest termination rates per 
authorized judgeship, and why the tribunal relied substantially on 
visitors. Especially important will be the correlation, if any, between 
those phenomena and circuit size. 
Should evaluators conclusively decide that the court's present 
condition necessitates remediation, they must consider many 
potential solutions. Helpful sources will be the commissioners, their 
forerunners-including the United States Judicial Conference Long 
Range Planning Committee and the Federal Courts Study 
Committee-and scholars, who have surveyed numerous responses.124 
Assessors might also explore many constructive approaches that other 
tribunals have instituted or tested. For example, every court uses 
various forms of ADR and rather refined docket management 
mechanisms.125 
In short, evaluators must attempt to elucidate the important, 
unclear aspects of Judge Martin's article and the Commission work 
1394 (stating that the Sixth Circuit makes limited use of bench decisions, but only 
when all three judges agree that there is no precedential reason for a written 
opinion). 
123. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Detenninants of the Decision to 
Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REv. 213, 220 (1999) (analyzing the process of en 
bane review and concluding that such factors as "reversal of a lower court or agency 
ruling, filing a dissent by a panelist, and a liberal ruling" determine whether a court 
will rehear a panel decision); Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of 
the Large Circuit, in REsrRucruRING JUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) 
(examining the maintenance of uniformity in the application of federal law by 
federal appellate courts and focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of the Ninth 
Circuit and its en bane process); Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common 
Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 915, 921 (1991) (providing 
further evaluation of inconsistency and conflict in appellate panel decisions of the 
Ninth Circuit and of en bane process); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: 
The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 
547 (1989) (addressing the trends of the en bane process in the Ninth Circuit). 
124. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at 
109-23; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, at 67-70, 131-33; BAKER, supra note 10, at 
106-286; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-25, 59-74. 
125. See, e.g., JOE CECIL, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A 
LARGE .APPELLATE COURT: THE NINIH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985); 
REsTRUGI1JRING JUSTICE, supra note 123; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 31 
(discussing such measures as an "inventory system" of appeals that facilitates routing 
of cases with similar issues to the same panel of judges, and maintenance ofa team of 
six to eight attorneys charged with identifying cases for the court's mediation 
program); supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (summarizing the Commission's 
criticisms of the Sixth Circuit's management practices, including ADR and case 
screening). 
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while ascertaining more definitively whether the Sixth Circuit 
warrants treatment and, if so, designate the most appropriate 
remedies. The above propositions mean that additional study would 
be preferable because it should permit comparatively certain 
conclusions and facilitate experimentation and reform. 
B. A Miscellany of Ideas 
As demonstrated by the analysis above, more study appears to be 
the best approach. However, members of Congress or the Sixth 
Circuit might reject this notion because, for instance, they might 
think that the court has received adequate examination or that 
prompt action is imperative. Legislators or judges may want to 
consider, and could implement, numerous approaches to modernize 
the court, some of which Judge Martin or the commissioners mention 
and most of which would be compatible vvith a study. 
1. R.esponses to specific issues that judge Martin or the Commission raise 
The Sixth Circuit should address specific issues raised by Judge 
Martin and the Commission. Illustrative are the jurist's proposals 
that his colleagues restrict litigant ability to cite unpublished 
opinions, correspondingly limit their own citation to those 
determinations, and replace undue reliance on resolution from the 
bench with cogent, written justifications for decisions that most 
parties deserve.126 Reducing litigant capacity to cite would decrease 
judicial citation, and each phenomenon could minimize the 
remaining inequity that attends unequal access to unpublished 
opinions.127 The restriction, or elimination, of rulings from the 
bench and the concomitant provision of written explanations would 
afford several benefits, such as greater fairness for parties and 
increased judicial visibility and accountability. These actions would 
also conform Sixth Circuit practices more closely to those of other 
courts, 128 and perhaps save some expense and time which dissimilar 
local appellate strictures can impose.129 
Both Judge Martin and the commissioners confilm the 
126. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (presenting Judge Martin's 
assessment that certain appeals courts rely too heavily on unpublished opinions and 
thereby fail to dispense justice effectively and uphold the appellate ideal). 
127. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing judge Martin's view that 
effective court operation entails prompt, economic and fair treatment of cases). 
128. See supra notes 48-49, 60-65 and accompanying text (surveying courts' policies 
regarding issuance of and citation to unpublished opinions). 
129. See Sisk, supra note 30, at 25-34 (describing the delays and costs imposed by 
conflicting procedural rules between the appeals courts). 
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conventional wisdom that the Sixth Circuit has confronted, and may 
well continue to face, burgeoning caseloads with relatively limited 
resources.
130 Indeed, these very circumstances prompted Judge 
Martin to defend, and the court to rely on, unpublished decisions. 
The Commission's study correspondingly suggests that an insufficient 
number of published opinions are afforded, and appeals per 
authorized judgeship are terminated, by the Sixth Circuit, while it 
depends substantially on visiting judges and may resolve cases too 
slowly.131 These concerns strongly implicate docket growth and scarce 
resources. Congress and the court, therefore, have two principal 
means of responding. One alternative would be a reduction in the 
number of appeals, essentially by limiting federal civil or criminal 
jurisdiction, an idea which Judge Merritt broached in the 
Commission report 132 This prospect lacks promise, however, because 
senators and representatives appear reluctant to restrict 
jurisdiction.133 The second option, accordingly, would be the direct 
treatment of caseload increases. 
A rather controversial way to address growing dockets would be 
expansion of the Sixth Circuit's judicial and general resources. For 
instance, if lawmakers authorized several additional judgeships, the 
court could issue more published opinions, rely less on visitors and 
expedite resolution. A valuable source for the exact number of 
judges who might be needed is the Judicial Conference's suggestions 
for Congress, which it bases on relatively conservative calculations of 
appeals and judges' workloads.134 Those recommendations propose 
130. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (describing the increase in 
appellate dockets, and discussing the causes); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix 
(finding that increasing caseloads have transformed the role and function of U.S. 
Courts of Appeals). 
131. See supra notes 72-73, 76-77, 80-85 and accompanying text. 
132. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 77-88 (urging Congress to adopt a 
reformed diversity jurisdiction, which would require a showing of local bias or 
complexity of interstate litigation before suit in federal court would be permitted). 
SeegenerallyLoNGRANGEPl.AN, supra note 17, at 134; McKENNA, supra note 17, at 141-
53. 
133. See judge Stephen G. Breyer, The D011ahue Lecture Series: Administering]ustice in 
the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 29, 34-37 (1990) (tracing Congress' reluctance 
to reduce federal jurisdiction to its reluctance to overburden state courts, its 
perception that doing so will make little overall difference, its desire to avoid raising 
specialist versus generalist controversies, and a fear that constituents will perceive the 
reduction as eroding other, more fundamental aspects of federal jurisdiction); 
William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 719, 722-25 
(1995) (outlining political pressures faced by Congress to federalize law that 
traditionally has been the province of the states); Martin, supra note l, at 181 
(describing the majority of congressional statutes as increasing the caseload of the 
federal courts). 
134. See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal]udges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 
HAsrlNGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 753 (1997) (naming the factors considered by the 
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two new judicial positions for the Sixth Circuit and are included in a 
Senate bill,135 although the questions of whether more judges are 
necessary and, if so, how many, remain controversial. For example, 
Judge Martin has argued that the "court's existing caseload justifies at 
least 18 judgeships."136 Nevertheless, Senator Charles Grassley (R-
Iowa), whose judiciary subcommittee has studied the allocation issue, 
recently considered "significant that the vote of the Sixth Circuit 
judges to request additional judgeships was not unanimous," while he 
asserted that "it is not clear that new judgeships should be created" 
for the court until the tribunal "takes alternative approaches to 
manage its caseload efficiently."137 Moreover, an increase in circuit 
membership can reach a point of diminishing returns.138 Thus, this 
option might be unrealistic, particularly in light of much 
congressional and judicial opposition to expanding the bench.139 If 
these views persist, temporary judgeships could be a practical 
compromise. 
An infusion of nonjudicial resources might be responsive to the 
above concerns. For instance, enlarging the number of staff 
attorneys or their responsibilities may decrease the time which judges 
spend on administrative tasks, so that they can devote greater effort 
to the production of published opinions and perhaps increase the 
dispositions per judgeship and limit reliance on visitors. Indeed, 
Senator Grassley found that the court's resistance to enhanced use of 
the attorneys in preparing decisions has "foreclosed an opportunity 
for judges to reduce the circuit's workload."140 Expanding staff size, 
Judicial Conference when making recommendations for additional judgeships). But 
see GRASSLEY, suflra note 80, at 2-7 (criticizing the Judicial Conference factors). 
135. See S. fl45, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing for the appointment of two 
additional Federal Circuit judges for the Sixth Circuit; last referred to the Judiciary 
Committee on May 27, 1999); S. 3071, 106th Cong. (2000) (same). See generally 
William H. Rehnquist, 1999 Year-End Report on theFederaljudiciary (1999). 
136. See GRASSLEY, supra note 80, at 1. 
137. See id. at 4. 
138. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at iii, 29-30 (contending that an 
increase in the number of judges often reduces the effectiveness of the court); see also 
Jon 0. Newman, 1000 judges-The Limit for an Effective judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 
( 1993) (arguing that the size of the federal judiciary should be limited to 1000 judges 
so it does not become a vast and ineffective bureaucracy). See generally BAKER, supra 
note 10, at 135. 
139. Compare Newman, suflra note 138, at 187 (opposing the increase in size of the 
federal judiciary), with Stepnen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few 
judges, Too Many Cases, AB.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 (urging an increase in size of the 
federal judiciary). See generally GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS 
AND IMPLlCATIONS (1993); Carl Tobias, Federal judicial Selection in a Time of Divided 
Government, 47 EMORYLJ. 527 (1998). 
140. GRASSLEY, supra note 80, at 2. 
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or duties, however, could additionally bureaucratize the tribunal.141 
The court should explore other ways to conserve judicial resources. 
One helpful example involves bankruptcy appellate panels ("BAPs"), 
which the Ninth Circuit applied so successfully that Congress 
required every court to consider their implementation.142 This device 
minimizes the energy that appellate judges must devote to 
bankruptcy cases by invoking decisionmakers, namely bankruptcy 
judges, who are not appeals court members and possess specialized 
expertise. 
One constructive idea that the Senate and the President could 
rather felicitously implement is promptly filling the present Sixth 
Circuit judicial vacancies. Since 1995, the court has operated without 
the full complement of sixteen active judges whom .Congress has 
authorized.143 This situation forced the tribunal to rely even more on 
visitors and to cancel sixty oral arguments in 1997, imposing 
unwarranted cost and delay.144 Expeditious confirmation of nominees 
for the four current openings would enable the circuit to afford 
higher percentages of published opinions, deploy fewer visiting 
judges, and decide cases quicker. 
The court might also evaluate those tribunals that function best, 
especially vis-a-vis the parameters for which it performs less well, to 
determine whether these courts use measures that could improve 
circuit operations. For example, scrutiny of the Eleventh Circuit may 
indicate how the tribunal resolves twice the number of appeals per 
authorizedjudgeship.145 Seventh Circuit analysis might show how it 
issues published opinions at a rate thirty-two percent higher, while 
employing visitors at a rate thirty-three percent lower,146 and deciding 
141. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 26-28 (discussing changes in number of 
personnel and increases in budget of the federal judiciary over the last 50 years); 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITII, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT 
ADMINISTRATION 94-125 (1995) (discussing the systemic development of the federal 
judicial bureaucracy); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 23-25 (discussing 
the expansion of the number and responsibilities of central staff and law clerks); 
McKENNA, supra note 17, at 4g.55 (same); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 25, at 836-
37 (commenting on the danger of having large central staffs with significant roles). 
142. See generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), 
108 Stat. 4106, 4109-10 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); see 
also LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, at 47 (analyzing BAPs and statute). 
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1994) (indicating that this number of judges is 
authorized). 
144. See Chronic Federal judge Shortage Puts Lives, justice on Hold, LAs VEGAS REv. J., 
Aug. 13, 1997, at A9; see also Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Clams Circuit-Splitting 
Vacancies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1 (analyzing the problems that numerous, 
prolonged vacancies create). 
145. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93, tbl. 1 (indicating that 275 appeals 
per authorized judgeship are decided on their merits in the Eleventh Circuit). 
146. See id. at 108, tbl. 6a (documenting reliance on visitingjudges). 
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cases along five important measures faster, than the Sixth Circuit.147 
Congress and the court could examine, and consider prescribing, 
direct approaches to docket increases, which obseivers-including 
Judge Martin, scholars, as well as the Commission and its 
predecessors-have thoroughly canvassed during the last half-
century. 148 They should attempt to identify measures that would be 
most responsive to ways in which the circuit might work better, but 
that impose the fewest disadvantages. Illustrative are mechanisms 
which would enable the court to expedite resolution by conserving 
resources of the appellate judiciary. BAPs would seemingly permit 
the tribunal to conclude appeals faster and save time of circuit 
members by capitalizing on bankruptcy judges' expertise and 
resources with little detriment. Two-judge panels, or district court 
appellate panels149 and ADR would facilitate disposition and save 
resources of the circuitjudiciary.150 However, the decisional entities 
and the alternatives might erode significant process values, such as 
judicial visibility and accountability.151 Restricting litigants' procedural 
opportunities, namely oral arguments, would apparently have similar 
effects. These phenomena could concomitantly attend reliance on 
unpublished opinions, despite Judge Martin's persuasive defense. 
Judges may be able to designate easily appeals not meriting 
publication and to afford written explanations that suffice for parties, 
maintain consistent, coherent and predictable circuit law, expedite 
appeals, save appellate resources, and honor process values. 
Nonetheless, the limited scrutiny accorded unpublished opinions' 
invocation precludes very certain conclusions today. 
2. A word about experimentation 
The earlier discussion indicates that additional study is best, 
147. See id. at 95, tbl. 7 (referring to the number of months, on avera~e, the court 
takes in terminating a case after a hearing or submission, and finding that the 
Seventh Circuit is faster than the Sixth). 
148. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at 
110-25; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 67-76; BAKER, supra note 10, at 151-85, 
229-86. 
149. See LONG RANGE PLAN, su{Jra note 17, at 131-32; see also COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 62-65. Judge Martin thought that "2:iud~e panels had merit and 
should be authorized in the circuits on a trial or pilot basis.' GRASSLEY, supra note 80, 
at3. 
150. See Breyer, supra note 133, at 44 (discussing the recent popularity of non-
judicial dispute resolution, eSJ?ecially in matters where the costs of using courts and 
the legal system are so exhorb1tant that injustice may arise). See generally BAKER, supra 
note 10, at 197. 
151. See Merritt, supra note 9, at 1388 (favoring the continuance of oral arguments 
before judges because it is consistent with proper standards of visibility, 
accountability, and care). See generally BAKER, supra note 10, at 197. 
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however, the Sixth Circuit could institute a few actions without 
additional findings that would clearly improve its operations. 
Moreover, there might currently be adequate information to institute 
productive testing, although some measures' efficacy remains 
unclear. These ideas mean that Congress and the court may want to 
consider experimentation with promising approaches, which could 
proceed simultaneously with more study. 
The court should closely examine its operations, while the tribunal 
might attempt to specify aspects that deserve treatment and test 
responsive measures. The circuit could assess the ideas of Judge 
Martin and the commissioners to designate ways in which the court 
seems to function less well than it might. For example, some 
Commission information suggests that the tribunal relies too much 
on unpublished opinions and visitors and resolves appeals rather 
slowly. 
After the court has identified features of circuit performance that 
could be improved, it should delineate mechanisms that warrant 
experimentation. The tribunal can derive these devices by 
identifying courts that operated well vis-a-vis the Commission indicia, 
by communicating with other circuits and by contacting the FJC and 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which are repositories 
for relevant information. The court might specifically evaluate the 
larger tribunals, namely the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, 
which have faced docket growth, and should remember that the 
Ninth Circuit has experimented with innovative approaches to 
caseload increases for many years. 
The Sixth Circuit could also consider the Commission suggestions 
in addition to the divisional concept. The court's large, expanding 
docket may lead it to apply twojudge, or district court appellate, 
panels. These bodies might foster prompt and inexpensive 
disposition of numerous appeals and conserve resources, but the 
panels can jeopardize fair decisionmaking and undermine the 
judiciary' s accountability and visibility.152 The tribunal could respond 
to Senator Grassley' s overture by placing greater reliance on staff 
attorneys in the preparation of opinions, but this may increase 
bureaucratization.153 Once the court has identified salutary 
approaches, it should carefully apply them. 
The experimentation conducted must receive rigorous analysis. 
152. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing the tradeoff 
between nonjudicial dispute resolution and advantages of judges' visibility). 
153. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text {describing the possible 
dangers of expanding staff size). 
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Testing should continue for a sufficient period in diverse enough 
contexts to discern confidently the measures' effectiveness. An 
expert, independent evaluator must systematically gather, assemble, 
assess, and synthesize the maximum applicable empirical data. After 
experimentation has received analysis, it should be possible to 
determine with great certainty whether the circuit needs remediation 
and, if so, why and to designate the best solutions. 
Congress and_ the Sixth Circuit should institute the above 
suggestions for several reasons. First and foremost, the ideas would 
enable the tribunal to enhance operations in areas that Judge Martin 
or the commissioners indicate need improvement. Moreover, the 
proposals are a good faith attempt to ascertain more clearly whether 
the Sixth Circuit in fact requires treatment, and, if so, to delineate 
effective remedies. Finally, the approach could test the accuracy of 
the assertions posited by Judge Martin and the Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Martin has provided valuable perspectives on the Sixth 
Circuit, as witnessed through the prism of unpublished opinions. His 
focus on these decisions, however, is overly narrow, while he provides 
minimal empirical data. The Commission study elaborates the jurist's 
work, yet its endeavor is insufficiently comprehensive and refined, 
even in combination with Judge Martin's ideas, to support conclusive 
determinations. Therefore, more study, perhaps in conjunction with 
experimentation, is warranted, while the court should implement 
measures that promise to improve its present operations. 
